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A CRITICAL NOTE ON PRIEST’S FIVE-VALUED CATUṢKOṬI
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ABSTRACT: Graham Priest has offered a rational reconstruction of Buddhist thought that
involves, first, modeling the Catuṣkoṭi by a four valued logic, and then later adding a fifth
value, read as “ineffability”. This note examines that fifth value and raises some concerns
about it that seem grave enough to reject it. It then sketches an alternative to Priest’s account
that has no need for the fifth value.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In his book “The Fifth Corner of Four” (Priest 2018), Graham Priest draws together
material from many years of work on the logical aspects of Buddhist philosophy.1
The result is a stimulating and original account of Buddhist philosophy’s journey
from India to China, and from there on to Japan.
This note is a critical comment on the first part of the book, dealing with Indian
discussions of ineffability, emptiness and ultimate truth. The particular lens through
which these issues are observed is Priest’s analysis of the Catuṣkoṭi (“four
corners”), a traditional reasoning pattern in Indian philosophy.
________________________
KAPSNER, ANDREAS: PhD, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Germany. Email:
Andreas.Kapsner@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
1

For this piece, the most important papers that the book draws on are Priest 2009, Priest 2010,
Priest 2011, Priest 2014, Priest 2017 and Deguchi et al. 2008. It is interesting to note the subtle
changes Priest has made when working these materials into the book, but I have chosen not to
get too far into the weeds and to take the position defended in the book as definitive.
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Here is one of the textual examples in which the four perspectives are displayed
(from the Agivacchagotta Sutta, quoted on p.16ff of Priest’s book):
“How is it, Master Gotama, does Master Gotama hold the view: ‘After death a
Thathāgata exists: only this is true, anything else is wrong’ ?”
“Vaccha, I do not hold the view: ‘After death a Thathāgata exists: only this is true,
anything else is wrong’.”
“How then, does Master Gotama hold the view: ‘After death a Thathāgata does not
exist: only this is true, anything else is wrong’?”
“Vaccha, I do not hold the view: ‘After death a Thathāgata does not exist: only this is
true, anything else is wrong’.”
“How is it, Master Gotama, does Master Gotama hold the view: ‘After death a
Thathāgata both exists and does not exist: only this is true, anything else is wrong’?”
“Vaccha, I do not hold the view: ‘After death a Thathāgata both exists and does not exist:
only this is true, anything else is wrong’.”
“How then, does Master Gotama hold the view: ‘After death a Thathāgata neither exists
nor does not exist: only this is true, anything else is wrong’?”
“Vaccha, I do not hold the view: ‘After death a Thathāgata neither exists nor does not
exist: only this is true, anything else is wrong’.”

Not only is the question viewed from four angles; what is more, all of the
options are denied. This adds an intriguing twist that we will come to. For now, we
take Priest’s point that the mere mention of these four alternatives shows that the
Buddhists were willing to engage with them all, in particular the challenging third
and fourth options.
Being a reconstruction that uses the tools of modern logic, Priest first tackles
the Catuṣkoṭi by modeling it in a four-valued logic. Then, he sees reason to add a
fifth value to the logic, in order to deal with negated forms of the Catuṣkoṭi
(where all four possibilities seem to be denied). This point is where the main
interest of my essay lies. I will question whether the addition of the fifth value really
makes sense, or whether what it signifies should better be treated outside of the
logical part of the reconstruction. My conclusion will be that the fifth value is,
indeed, rather problematic.
To locate my critique with respect to two particularly interesting additions to
this debate: Cotnoir criticizes the logic Priest presents on the grounds that it does
not capture the inferences that are taken to be valid in the Buddhist texts. Cotnoir
then offers an alternative formalization in the spirit of the Tibetan philosopher
Tsongkhapa (Cotnoir 2015). Kreutz, in turn, offers a critique of this Tsongkhapian
treatment, and proposes a further amendment (Kreutz 2019).
My criticism here is somewhat more abstract than theirs, as I will not be
concerned with any particular inferences. Rather than worrying about the right
way to fit a fifth value into the picture, I wonder whether we should make the
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attempt at all.
I’d like to state from the outset that this critique only concerns a particular
part of Priest’s otherwise splendid book. At the same time, given that the book
is called “The Fifth Corner of Four” and my critique is exactly about this fifth
corner, it is clear that it is a rather central piece of the puzzle that is at stake
here.
2. PRIEST’S LOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CATUṢKOṬI
2.1

FOUR CORNERS, FOUR VALUES

Before we get to the fifth value, let us see how Priest gets to the already
unconventionally high number of four truth values in the first phase of his analysis.
In classical logic, of course, there are only two truth values: True and False.
However, as indicated above, there are several instances in Indian philosophical
texts in which a question seems to be viewed from four angles, the four corners of
the Catuṣkoṭi: A given statement might be true, it might be false, it might be both
true and false, or it might be neither true nor false.
To anyone familiar with the current landscape of non-classical logic, this will
immediately be reminiscent of the logic known as First Degree Entailment (FDE),
and indeed, it is Priest’s suggestion to use this logic as a basis for his analysis of
the Buddhist texts (2018, 25 ff).
FDE arranges the four values of the Catuṣkoṭi in a lattice, as displayed in the
following Hasse diagram:

n

b

f
Here is the intended interpretation of these four values, corresponding to the four
values of the Catuṣkoṭi (P being a statement):
• P has the value t: P is true and not false.
• P has the value f: P is false and not true.
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• P has the value b: P is both true and false.
• P has the value n: P is neither true nor false.
To get a logic, we interpret conjunction as the meet, disjunction as the join, and
negation as an operator that flips t and f but is a fixed-point operator for b and n.
As is customary, Priest takes t and b as the designated values, as they contain (at
least) truth, and truth is what is normally preserved in logical inference. I have, in
earlier work, questioned that choice of designated values in other contexts, and I
believe that my worries could be deployed here, as well.2 However, for this piece,
I will go with Priest and the mainstream concerning this point in order to get to my
main concern as swiftly as possible.
2.2

THE FIFTH VALUE

After making his case for FDE as the right logical framework for the “normal”
occurrences of the Catuṣkoṭi, Priest moves on to the even more challenging cases
in which each of the four alternatives seems to be denied. Especially the famous
and influential philosopher Nāgārjuna uses this form of argument to stir up
interpretational trouble, but it also appears throughout the texts that predate him
(the quoted example above is such an earlier occurrence).
Priest solves this conundrum by introducing a new value, e, that is meant to be
interpreted as “ineffable”.3 The idea is that this value attaches to things that are
impossible to capture in words, so that all four cases the Catuṣkoṭi has to offer
need to be denied.
The rules for the new value are straightforward, in that e is considered to
be an “infectious” value: A complex statement takes value e iff at least one of
its constituent statements does. Thought about as representing ineffability, that
makes intuitive sense. If something is ineffable, then so is its negation, its
conjunction with something else, etc.
Priest places his new value in the middle of the four values (2018, 66), even
though, as he points out, it could just as well have been anywhere else.4

2

See Pietz (=Kapsner) and Rivieccio 2013, Kapsner 2014, and Kapsner 2016.
There are also hints throughout the book that the value might stand for “empty” or
“ultimately true”. For the purposes of this piece, however, my criticism is aimed at the
“ineffability”-interpretation.
4
The structure is not a lattice any more, and thus the diagram seems to be of limited use to
compute the values of complex statements. However, the picture is an evocative one, especially
if the new value is thought about in one of the alternative ways mentioned in the last footnote.
3
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b

f

Now, the last technical question to be settled is whether e is to be regarded as a
designated value or not. Priest says that we should not think of e as designated, for
reasons I will return to in the next section.
With all that in place, Priest is able to describe the new consequence relation
and give a proof system for it. He calls it FDEe and shows that it does not coincide
with FDE.
Once ineffability is in the picture, Priest points out that statements cannot plausibly
be the kind of things these five values attach to (2018, 67). If something is a statement,
then it is effable, so statements can never take value e. Instead, Priest suggests that we
should start, at this point, to think about states of affairs that either obtain, don’t obtain,
both obtain and do not obtain, or neither obtain nor do not obtain. In his terminology,
to the semantic Catuṣkoṭi, which is about truth, we are now adding a new ontological
Catuṣkoṭi, which has five values5 and can be applied to ineffable states of affairs as
well as effable ones.
Here is how he suggests to read the ontological truth values (A being a state of
affairs):
• A has the value t: A is effable, A obtains and ¬A does not.
• A has the value f: A is effable, ¬A obtains and A does not.
• A has the value b: A is effable, both A and ¬A obtain.
• A has the value n: A is effable, neither A nor ¬A obtains.
• A has the value e: A is ineffable (as is ¬A). (2018, 68)
Priest also sketches a correspondence theory of truth that connects the semantic
and the ontological Catuṣkoṭi. The link is the rather obvious principle that “to be
true is for the state of affairs described to obtain” (2018, 71), though, of course,
how this plays out in a setting with truth value gaps and gluts as well as ineffable
5

A five-valued Catuṣkoṭi is in itself a contradictory concept, but that is deliberately done and
could easily have been avoided. After all, Priest’s book is called “The Fifth Corner of Four”.
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states of affairs is not quite so obvious. Though he does not pin down all the details,
Priest makes a plausible case for the viability of such a theory.
2.3

PLURIVALENT LOGIC

Having achieved as much, Priest then goes on to argue that the Buddhists are
headed for a new cluster of contradictions, in that they talk in their texts about
ineffable states of affairs. That is, they talk about things one cannot talk about. The
ineffable seems to be, in a way, effable after all (2018, 75).
The way he solves this problem is by going to a plurivalent logic, that is, by
allowing states of affairs to take more than one value. That is, a state of affairs
might be ineffable and effable and obtain, viz, take value {e, t}. He says that, at
least as far as the Buddhist texts go, he sees no reason to allow for more than one
value out of t, f, b, and n to attach to a state of affairs.6
He does not list them explicitly, but here is, if I understand him correctly, the
space of nine values that this construction gives us:
{t}, {f}, {b}, {n}, {e, t}, {e, f}, {e, b}, {e, n}, {e}
A state is designated iff at least one of t and b attaches to it. To be explicit, the
designated values are:
{t}, {b}, {e, t}, {e, b}
The resulting logic, as it happens, coincides with FDEe.
Before I move on, note two things about the plurivalent construction; the point
of these observations will become apparent below.
First, all two-membered values are contradictory, because effability is built into
values t, f, b and n.
Second, if {e} were also excluded from the space of values, the consequence
relation would obviously coincide with FDE, and e would be logically
incapacitated, in that it would play absolutely no role to logical inferences whether
a state of affairs relates to e or not.

6

I don’t want to dwell on this too much, but here is a stanza from Nāgārjuna that, to me, would
sound like a state of affairs that takes {t, f, b, n} (or maybe even all five values, given the larger
context):
Everything is real and is not real,
Both real and not real,
Neither real nor not real.
This is Lord Buddha’s teaching. (MMK XVIII:8)
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3. CONCERNS ABOUT VALUE e
So much for exposition of Priest’s work. I will now get to the critical part of this
essay, in which I will point to four interconnected problems I see with value e. In
the next section, I will develop an alternative account that avoids these problems.
As I have mentioned in the introduction, there are questions about Priest’s
reconstruction that may be raised before this point in the book. Indeed, such
questions have been raised, some of them rather cogently so.7 Here, I am not
concerned with these. I am assuming, for the purposes of this essay at least, that
Priest’s treatment of contradictory statements in Buddhist texts makes sense, that
the question of what happens to logical consequence makes sense, and that the
application of FDE is a sensible one. What I’ll have to say about value e will
interact with those questions, but my critique here is not primarily meant to
undermine Priest’s reconstruction at these points.
With that in mind, let us examine value e and its properties. Here are a number
of desiderata for newly introduced logical values that, as I will argue, e fails to
espouse.
1. The logical values should form a cohesive set.
2. The values should “look like” topics apt for logical study. If they don’t, we
should at least have a strong argument for showing that appearance
wrong.
3. The addition of the value should make a difference to logical consequence.
4. We should be able to get a clear idea whether or not a value is designated.
I speak of desiderata because I don’t think of e’s failing to have them as necessarily
disastrous on an individual level (though the last point, to my mind, comes very close).
However, the fact that e is not meeting them should, collectively, raise some serious
doubts about it.
3.1

INCONGRUOUS CONCEPTS

Here is the first problem: The five values seem to be a rather incongruous bunch.
The first four, of course, fit together quite well, but the new value seems to stick
out quite dramatically. Whether a state of affairs obtains or not (or both or neither)
seems to have little to do conceptually with whether it is effable.
Ineffability also seems independent from the other values in the following
sense: Both being effable and being ineffable are perfectly compatible with
obtaining, not obtaining, both and neither. Adding ineffability as a fifth logical
7

In addition to the references given above, see, for example, Siderits 2019 and Westerhoff 2019.
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value seems to indicate, at least prima facie, incompatibility with the other values.
It’s true that there is indeed such a prima facie8 incompatibility with the semantic
values—but we’re not adding the fifth value to the semantic values. It is the
ontological values that receive the augmentation, and here there is, as I just said,
no reason to expect any of the first four values to be incompatible with the new
value.
Of course, the later development in the plurivalent direction makes these
combinatorial possibilities explicit. But in a way, that solution seems to be a
technical fix for a problem that stems from a design that brings together values of
radically different kinds. The suspicion, at this early stage, is that there might be a
simpler way to deal with these issues by keeping the strata from which these values
are drawn more cleanly apart.
Now, one might object that I’ve been phrasing this worry too strongly. The way
Priest interprets the first four ontological values (e.g. as “A has the value t: A is
effable, A obtains and ¬ A does not.”), they are both about obtaining and being
effable. So there is a connection, and also a prima facie incompatibility here.
But I am not sure why we need to do it in the way Priest does. An ontological
value that only concerns itself with issues of obtaining seems perfectly coherent,
and, indeed, more cleanly “ontological” than the “ontological/semantic” hybrid we
get in Priest’s book. I’ll try to set up such a “cleaner” alternative in section 4.
3.2

IS INEFFABILITY APT TO BE MODELLED LOGICALLY?

The strata from which the five values are mined are not only different ones, they
also appear to lend themselves to logical treatment to unequal degrees: While
“obtaining” is something that clearly seems apt to be treated by logical means,
(in)effability seems to be a much more exotic object of logical study.
That does not mean that logic is the wrong tool to use, but in applying it we should
give a good supporting story that clarifies why logic is the right tool. Let me illustrate
by making the following analogy involving a clearly misguided expansion of the
logical space: Instead of adding a fifth value to the ontological values, let’s add a fifth
value to the semantic values which, remember, attach to sentences. Call it c, for
“clumsily phrased”.
Of course, this is a facetious example. I know of no one who would consider
“clumsily phrased” deserving of a status as a logical value. But where, exactly, lies the
difference between “ineffable” and “clumsily phrased” that makes one a worthy logical
value and the other not?
I’m not sure. It is not, as one might think, that ineffability is inherently more
important to a philosopher of logic than clumsy phrasing. I have more than one
8

Of course, the “prima facie” aspect is soon discovered to be just that as the story in Priest’s
book unfolds. Once things that are effable and ineffable are considered, the supposed
incompatibility disappears, and the plurivalent construction bears that out.
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book on my shelf that is supposed to help avoid the latter. Needless to say, none
of them propose to set up a consequence relation with the help of something like
a value c.
Let us explore one potential answer I can imagine being given that tries to explain
why the logical value c should be ruled out, while e should not. In order to bring it out
clearly, we’ll need to pretend for the length of a couple of paragraphs that we’re really
trying to make the setup with c work.
Now, we know from experience that some sentences are true and clumsily
phrased, others false and not clumsily phrased, and so on. If our experience
includes gaps and gluts, we also know from experience that some sentences are
both true and false and clumsily phrased, others neither true nor false nor clumsily
phrased, and so on again. That is, we will be needing to resort to Priest’s plurivalent
construction. However, should we expect to be using the full line-up of nine values
corresponding to Priest’s values, viz.:
{t}, {f}, {b}, {n}, {c, t}, {c, f}, {c, b}, {c, n}, {c}?
It seems to me that no declarative sentence can be clumsily phrased without being
at least one of true, false, both or neither. If it’s just clumsily phrased, it’s not a
declarative sentence (and even if we were to allow other linguistic constructions as
values for our propositional variables, such as questions or even nonsensical
sentences, one of the values, namely “neither true nor false” would seem to apply
to them). That is, we should get rid of {c} in the above list.
Keeping everything else parallel to the exposition in section 2, we will be faced
with an analogous observation to the one I made at the very end of that section:
Value c is logically idle. And, in a way, that seems quite apt, in that it makes no
difference to logically consequence whether the sentences in an inference are
clumsily phrased or not.
Now, here is the potential argument that might be made on the basis of these
observations: One might argue that the addition of value e needs to be of concern
to logic, as it has repercussions for logical consequence. The value c, I’ve argued,
doesn’t have such repercussions, and thus it should not be allowed among the
logical values. That argument has its appeal, but it depends on the plurivalent
value {e} making more sense than {c}. Does it?
3.3 LOGICAL INERTIA
Let us then turn to this question, concerning the plurivalent construction: Does it
make sense to allow {e} as one of the plurivalent values? As we have seen, e only
makes a difference to logical consequence if states that are only {e} exist, so this is an
important question.
The case is not as clear as in the case of clumsy c. However, I have to say that I
don’t see evidence of the thought that there are {e}-states in the Buddhist scriptures,
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neither in the texts Priest cites nor in the (admittedly limited) selection of texts I know
that go beyond those quotes.
Following Priest’s analysis, I’m happy to acknowledge that there are
(according to Buddhist philosophy) ineffable states that obtain, and that under the
plurivalent construction in the book they will receive value {e, t}. Of course, if
there are some of these, there will be corresponding {e, f} states. As Priest shows,
there is a very close proximity between ineffability and paradox, so one should
expect there to be {e, b} states, as well. If there are any left after sorting them into
these three categories, they’ll probably be naturally viewed as {e, n} (the sorting
and viewing will, of course, have to be done by some enlightened being).
What I don’t see is why after all this, we should want to have {e} as a possible
value. What might make us think that there will be any states left after the {e, t}-,
{e, f}-, {e, b}-, {e, n}-states are accounted for? That is, why should there be
ineffable states of affairs that neither obtain, nor fail to obtain, nor both obtain
and do not obtain, nor neither obtain nor do not obtain?9
Here is a potential argument one might make on behalf of Priest’s construction
and the necessity of {e}-states: If there aren’t any states that are just {e}, then
all states of affairs are effable (such as {t}-states, which, on Priest’s reading, are
states that are effable and obtain), or effable and ineffable (such as {e, t}). But
why shouldn’t there be any states that are just ineffable, without being effable as
well? So we can’t rule out {e}, and, a fortiori, e itself as logical values.
Of course, I have no argument to offer why there wouldn’t be states that are
just ineffable (without being effable as well). To the contrary, I find it much more
plausible to assume that there are such states of affairs than not. Therefore, I would
surely not want to prejudge that issue by proposing a potentially rash choice of
formalism that rules this possibility out. However, the argument above crucially
depends, again, on the following fact: On Priest’s reading, effability is built right
into the meaning of the ontological values {t}, {f}, {b} and {n}. If it wasn’t, {e, t}
(for example) would denote a state of affairs that obtains and is ineffable (without
being effable as well).
I have indicated above that I think this mixing of the semantic and the
ontological is not necessary, and that a cleaner picture might be attainable by
keeping things apart. Again, I will try to sketch such a picture in section 4.
What remains to be said in this subsection is this: If we have no reason to allow
{e} as one of the plurivalent values, we also have made no logical difference when
compared to the situation before we introduced value e, as the plurivalent logic
coincides with FDE. Maybe the picture with the fifth value in place is somehow more
complete, but in terms of logical consequence, we could have had it easier.
If one looks a bit closer, it becomes apparent that this point rests not only on
the (in)admissibility of {e}. It also depends on the fact that e is an undesignated
9

I italicized the parts corresponding to logical values just to make this more readable.
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value, which leads me to the biggest problem I see with this value.
3.4 THE QUESTION OF DESIGNATION
In the exposition in section 2, I have told you that Priest chooses to treat e as an
undesignated value. I have not, though, told you why he does so.
His reason is deceptively simple: Ineffability is not a species of truth, and truth
is what is to be preserved in logical inferences. Hence, e cannot be among the
designated values:
From the old values, t and b are designated, since they are both species of truth. e is
not designated: ineffability is not a species of truth. So the designated values are still
just t and b. (p.66)

This argument comes before the pivot to states of affairs as bearers of
ontological values, and the question of the (non)designation of e does not come up
again.
What goes by unmentioned is that once we move away from the semantic
values, i.e., once we are not talking about truth and falsity any more, it does not
seem to make much sense to base the decision whether e should be designated on
the question whether it represents a “species of truth”. Of course it doesn’t, it isn’t
a semantic value. But all the other ontological values fail to be species of truth, as
well! Taking this criterion would lead us to a logic with no designated values at all.
Given that the designated values of Priest’s five valued logic are t and b (this is,
I believe, only explicitly mentioned in the technical appendix on page 73), it is
therefore apparent that truth is not the mark of designation in the ontological
setting. What t and b have in common (and don’t share with any of the other values)
is that they attach to states of affairs that obtain. The clear suggestion is, then, the
following: Whether an ontological value is designated must hinge on whether or
not it obtains.
So, do e-states obtain, or do they not? If Priest’s analysis is correct, then it is
surely the point of some of the Buddhist texts that some of them do obtain. On the
other hand, it seems absurd to assume that all possible ineffable states of affairs
obtain. So, it would seem that if “obtaining” is the criterion of designation, we can’t
make a decision whether e should be designated, which is a serious problem for a
logical value. Some e-states will have to be designated, some others will not be
designated, and there are no structural clues10 as to when the first option or when
the second option holds.
10

Such as in the work of Cobreros, Egre, Ripley and van Rooi (e.g., Cobreros et al., 2012), in
which values can also be both designated and, in other cases, undesignated, but where there is
a clear intra-logical indication which of these cases we are dealing with at any given time.
Likewise, I myself have developed similar ideas in Kapsner 2014. where the question of
designation is partly settled by the linguistic context.

Comparative Philosophy 11.2 (2020)

KAPSNER

168

Are there other reasons to hold, with Priest, that value e should be
undesignated? Here is one way of thinking about this that might seem appealing
(but, I’ll argue presently, isn’t really): Designation is often tied to assertability, for
example in the works of Michael Dummett and others. Under such a view, a
statement is true if and only if it is assertable.
Now, there might be a sense that ineffability and unassertability are
conceptually closely related, maybe even identical: They both, after all, refer to
things you can’t say.
But here lurks a misunderstanding of the nature of the modality in “ineffable”
and “unassertable”. The latter, understood as a bridge to truth, is certainly
normative in nature: you should not assert something that is unassertable in this
sense (for example, because it is false). But of course, you could.
Ineffability seems to be of a different nature: Something is ineffable if it can’t
be conceptualized or put into words. This is a practical impossibility11, not a
normative matter. For all the Buddhists care, you can go right ahead and try to eff
the ineffable, it’s just that their bet is that you won’t succeed.
Ineffability, in that regard, is like unpronounceability: The longest place name
in Britain, Llanfairpwllgwyngyllgogerychwyrndrobwllllantysiliogogogoch, is all
but unpronounceable, but that does not mean that there is a norm against
pronouncing it.
Maybe, a more appealing story about e’s logical status might be this: Logical
consequence is about drawing inferences, which is done in language. So, only
things that are effable should be transmitted over the turnstile. In that case, it would
be clear why e is undesignated. The value e, in this picture, would behave much
like the middle value in Weak Kleene logic under Bochvar’s “meaningless”
interpretation.12
However, there is an important difference to Bochvar’s interpretation: The
position under consideration seems rather unstable in that it holds that logic should
be about statements, and at the same time cannot be about statements if the value e
is to be read as ineffability, for the reasons Priest gave. I don’t know that there is
much hope for e in this alternative arrangement.
Let us suppose, for the span of this paragraph, that there were some way to
overcome this problem. If we then chose to go down that road, we would have to
revise the definition of plurivalent designation, as well. We’d need to exclude all
plurivalent values from the subset of designated ones that contain e, because these
are unsuitable for logical treatment (even if they, in addition, obtain, or if they both
obtain and do not obtain). That is, the only designated values would be {t} and {b}.
This would result in a very weak logic, in which, for example, disjunction
introduction would not be valid any more. This proposal would, then, clearly be
11

At least until you get to the effability gluts discussed in Priest’s book, then it is not even clear that
it is a practical impossibility any more.
12
Bochvar and Bergmann 1981.
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deviating from the direction in which Priest is heading in the book (if there is some
sense that can be made of it at all).
4. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
The last section has presented my reasons for being quite hesitant to adopt the fifth
value, and I take this critical part to be the main contribution this piece has to make
to the discussion. Nonetheless, one might quite naturally ask: Assuming my critical
remarks are convincing, then what can be done? Let me end by giving at least a
sketch of an answer.
My alternative proposal is very simple. I will propose to use four values for
both the semantic as well as the ontological Catuṣkoṭi. I will differentiate these by
subscripts, such as ts and no.
Here are my readings of these values (P is a statement; A is a state of affairs):
Semantic Values:
• P has the value ts: P is true and not false.
• P has the value fs: P is false and not true.
• P has the value bs: P is both true and false.
• P has the value ns: P is neither true nor false.
Ontological Values:
• A has the value to : A obtains and ¬A does not.
• A has the value fo: ¬A obtains and A does not.
• A has the value bo: both A and ¬A obtain.
• A has the value no : neither A nor ¬A obtains.
The semantic values are just what Priest took them to be. The difference lies
with the ontological ones: In addition to being just four, they do not make any
mention of effability.
It is by keeping these matters cleanly apart in this manner that we can make do
with two four-valued Catuṣkoṭi (cf., the argument towards the end of sec. 3.3).
These will be joined at the hip in the case of effable states of affairs, but in the case
of ineffable states, there will be nothing more to apply than the ontological
Catuṣkoṭi.
That the effable states and the corresponding statements are “joined at the
hip” does not at all mean that there needs to be some bridge built into the values
themselves (such as Priest does when he builds effability into the ontological
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values). It is quite enough to set up a correspondence theory along the lines that
Priest sketches in his book. As he admits, there will be many more things to be said
about this than he himself has space to spell out; I will not try to do the issue any
more justice here, but I’m happy to assume, with Priest, that this is a feasible
endeavor.
Where does ineffability enter this picture? It is just a property that those states
that have no corresponding statements share. We can add a predicate that
corresponds to this property, as long as we are happy with the paradoxical direction
in which this is obviously taking us. As Priest argues, the Buddhists were fearless
in that regard, so it makes sense to take such a predicate on board. But, beyond that,
will anything go awry if we do not have a logical value corresponding to ineffability
in our analysis?
Well, how does the e-less analysis deal with the examples that motivated the
introduction of this value in the first place, i.e., the negated occurrences of the
Catuṣkoṭi? Once all alternatives that the four semantic values represent are denied,
what value is left to attach to the statement in question on the proposed account?
None. But note that Priest does not have a value to offer, either, at least not a
semantic one. The underlying state of affairs might be e, but that does not tell us
what to say about the statement. Both accounts seem to be in similar predicaments
here.
I think that the best way to go here is to argue that the denial is a meta-linguistic
one: Vaccha and the other characters who are laying out four-fold alternatives are
not using the right words to get at what they are trying to get at. And by not giving
an alternative formulation, their interlocutor is indicating that there is none: What
Vaccha et al are trying to get at is ineffable.
The denial of the Catuṣkoṭi is trying to point at a state of affairs that might obtain,
or not, or both, or neither, but in any case cannot be correctly referred to with
words. Wittgenstein’s ladder is kicked away right as we are trying to climb it, in the
hope, maybe, that we land on our backs in just the right angle that allows us to
spot the semantically unattainable ultimate reality high above us.
I don’t pretend that that is a full theory of all that it going on, and I’m not out
to develop one. In addition to being more than sketchy about exegetical matters, I
have also completely ignored the question of whether the induced consequence
relation is able to model Buddhist thinking, the main problem the works mentioned
in the introduction, Cotnoir (2015) and Kreutz (2019), concerned themselves with.
Maybe the four values will have to be treated quite differently from the way FDE
treats them, even if that will mean that the eminently picturesque four-cornered
lattice will be lost.
However, I think it is prima facie plausible that some such logical picture can
be made sense of and that it can be brought into harmony with informal attempts
to interpret the Buddhists’ use of the Catuṣkoṭi. Ineffability is clearly an
important part of the larger story, but I am highly doubtful of the suggestion that
it needs to be drawn into the logical part of that story.
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5. SUMMARY
To sum up, I’ll repeat my reasons for being wary of treating ineffability as a logical
value:
1. Value e, representing ineffability, seems of a quite different kind than all the
other four values, whether they are thought of semantically or ontologically.
2. More, while “being true” for statements and “obtaining” for states of affairs
seem quite clearly candidates for things one might want to preserve over a
turnstile, “being effable” does not quite as clearly suggest itself for a logical
treatment.
3. It is not obvious that the plurivalent {e} has any use, and if we disallow it, then
no changes in terms of logical consequence will ensue compared with the four
valued account.
4. Lastly, it is not clear whether e should be a designated value.
I have furthermore argued for the following claim: If we strip the ontological
values of all mention of effability, we get a much simpler picture that avoids these
problems. We end up with two four-valued logics, one for statements and one for
states of affairs.
This picture is not only simpler, but also logically equivalent to Priest’s
plurivalent logic, provided there are no states that take value {e}. That is, provided
there are no ineffable states of affairs that neither obtain, nor fail to obtain, nor both
obtain and do not obtain, nor neither obtain nor do not obtain. As I indicated, I
don’t see why we need to provide for this possibility in our analysis of Buddhist
texts.
A full description of the states of affairs the ontological logic deals with will
include the property of ineffability being ascribed to some of them. But to encode
that property as a logical value seems to bring more problems than benefits.
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